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Introduction 
This article looks at the question of how the unitary charge 
payments of PFI contracts are indexed to allow for inflation 
over the 25 to 30 year life of the contract. This follows a 
number of articles and reports in which we have considered 
other aspects of PFI: among these, for example, were 
analyses of financial projections, where it was shown that 
there were high returns to consortia (2008): analyses of PFI 
contracts, showing inadequacies in the public sector 
approach, (2010a): and a study of the bidding process, 
indicating restricted competition, (2010b).  
 
How PFI payments are indexed is a topic is of particular 
importance, given current financial cutbacks. PFI unitary 
charge payments are long term contractual commitments, 
which constitute one of the first claims on local authority 
budgets. The existence of such ring fenced claims means 
that it is other parts of local authority services which have to 
bear the brunt of budget cuts.  
 
What our analysis indicates is that, in Scotland, a large 
number of local authorities have entered into arrangements 
which will commit them to increases significantly above the 
rate of inflation in the contributions that they will need to 
make to fund their contractual commitments to pay PFI 
unitary charges. Moreover, although complete information 
on authorities’ affordability assessments is not in the public 
domain, the information which is available indicates that a 
number of authorities in effect have cut corners in their 
affordability assessments, making assumptions which were 
unduly optimistic, or failing to assess fully the availability of 
funding over the whole life of the PFI contract. This means 
that many authorities will experience considerable difficulty 
in making their PFI contractual commitments, particularly 
since central government support to local authorities is likely 
to be progressively cut in real terms over the foreseeable 
future. The consequences, both in terms of an increasing 
squeeze on other local authority services, and in terms of 
pressure for steep council tax increases, are likely to be 
severe.  
 
The size of Scotland’s schools PFI commitment 
To set the material in this paper in context, we examine first 
the size of the overall commitment which local authorities in 
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Scotland have undertaken with regard  to future unitary 
charge payments for schools’ PFI projects. To date there 
have been 37 schools PFI contracts in Scotland, involving 
the new build or refurbishment of over 275 schools. (To 
avoid confusion, we should make it clear that for present 
purposes we include in this total the three projects which 
have been undertaken under the non-profit distributing 
variant of PFI). The resulting annual unitary charge 
payments to the consortia running the PFI schools are 
expected to rise from around £360 million in 2009-10 to 
around £430 million in 2011-12, when all existing PFI 
schools projects are in operation: (HM Treasury, 2010). 
These payments cover the ongoing cost of operating and 
maintaining the schools, the debt service and dividend 
payments to the financial providers, as well as any tax 
arising. 
 
Scottish local authorities have in fact embraced PFI much 
more enthusiastically than local authorities in England. 
According to Partnerships UK, of the 10 UK PFI schools 
schemes with a capital value of over £150 million, 6 are in 
Scotland, (Partnerships UK, 2010). Scotland, with just 8.5% 
of the UK’s population, has 40% of the UK’s PFI schools 
projects, as measured by capital value. This point is 
important, because it means that more of the local authority 
budget is ring-fenced for PFI in Scotland than is the case in 
England, so any associated financing problems in the era of 
coming overall budget austerity will be liable to be more 
pronounced in Scotland.  
 
Background on indexation and the 
affordability process  
Our primary concern is the handling of inflation over the life 
of a PFI contract, which typically lasts 25 to 30 years: that is, 
the question of how unitary charges are indexed to allow for 
future inflation. But this aspect is closely bound up with the 
authority’s initial assessment of the affordability of the 
project. In this section, we give some necessary background 
on both of these aspects of the PFI process.  
 
Background on indexation for inflation:  
The first aspect we look at is that of the provision for 
inflation in PFI contracts: that is, how the unitary charge 
payments made by the authority are indexed to compensate 
the consortium running the project for its exposure to 
inflation during the concession period of the project.  
To set this in context, in non-PFI capital procurement 
schemes the cost of the buildings etc. are paid directly by 
the public body, and the finance for the scheme is usually 
obtained from the National Loan Fund at a fixed rate of 
interest: the principal of the debt, and interest on the debt, 
are then repaid through time. So, if contributions are paid 
regularly to reduce the outstanding capital, the annual 
repayment will be made up of a part which falls through 
time, (namely, the interest payment), and a part which goes 
to the repayment of principal. If there is inflation, then 
through time, both the interest payments and the principal 
will tend to become relatively less of a burden on the 
Council’s finances.   
Now consider a PFI scheme for capital procurement. The 
most recent Treasury guidance on the handling of inflation 
in PFI contracts was given in May 2006. (HM Treasury, 
2006) The Treasury strongly recommend that there should 
be a matching of the indexation of the unitary charge to the 
underlying inflation exposure of the contractor’s costs during 
the service delivery period of the PFI contract, on the 
assumption that the contractor’s debt-servicing costs are 
fixed. So, if 40% of the initial unitary charge relates to capital 
costs and 60% relates to running costs, then that part of the 
unitary charge which is indexed is only 60%. The Treasury 
also pointed out that “over-indexing of the Unitary Charge 
can erode value for money”: by which they mean, naturally 
enough, that indexing part of the unitary charge which is not 
subject to inflation is liable to hand a windfall to the private 
sector consortium. 
 
Background on affordability:  
Before signing a PFI contract, the local authority has to 
assure itself and the Scottish Executive, not just that the 
contract represents good value for money, but also that the 
authority can afford the project: that is, that it has the 
financial resources to cover the payments which it has 
contracted to make over the lifetime of the project. (HM 
Treasury, 1997). 
 
Level playing field support:  
The Scottish Executive provides revenue support for PFI 
projects through the General Revenue Grant to local 
authorities to assist them in the payment of the unitary 
charge. This was formerly referred to as level playing field 
support. The exact amount of support is calculated as part 
of the PFI submission process: it is fixed and does not go up 
with inflation. The rest of the funds needed to cover the 
unitary charge payment have to be found from other council 
resources.  
 
The data 
The data we have studied consist of the final business 
cases, some contracts, and background documentation, 
including local authority audits, for all 37 Scottish local 
authority schools PFI projects signed in Scotland between 
1998 and 2009. Most PFI contracts were unavailable for 
scrutiny by the public until Freedom of Information: and 
indeed, only a very limited number have since been 
released. As regards the Final Business Cases, despite a 
Scottish Executive requirement that Final Business Cases 
be placed in the public domain, the amount of financial 
information redacted or removed before publication makes a 
large number of the publicly available documents almost 
worthless. Freedom of Information has, however, allowed 
the authors to access many unredacted final business 
cases. Finally, the Treasury provides annual information on 
actual and expected unitary charges for each project. 
  
Indexation in practice 
Examination of the detail in the final business cases and 
contracts indicates that the approach to future inflation 
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adopted by local authorities basically follows one of 
two main routes. Some authorities indexed a 
percentage of the initial unitary charge in line with an 
index such as RPI or RPIx, leaving the remainder 
fixed. Other authorities indexed the whole unitary 
charge, but at some percentage of RPI or RPIx. In 
both cases, we refer to the percentage chosen as the 
indexation percentage used by the authority. In 12 of 
the 37 projects, the indexation percentage was 100%: 
(obviously, when the indexation percentage is 100%, 
the two approaches, of indexing a percentage of the 
unitary charge or indexing the whole unitary charge at 
a percentage of RPI, are the same.) The large 
number of projects which are fully indexed is 
surprising, since this runs counter to the Treasury 
view that “Under PFI an RPI escalator typically 
applies to only part of the unitary charge (not including 
the element relating to initial capex)”: (HM Treasury, 
2007). 
Of the remaining 27 projects, 10 used the first 
approach, that is, indexing a percentage of the initial 
unitary charge: 15 used the second approach, that is, 
of indexing at a percentage of the chosen inflation 
index. As we will show later, the distinction between 
these two different approaches to indexation is 
important as regards the trajectory of future payments 
which the authority will have to make.  
In a small number of projects, further variations to 
these two broad approaches were incorporated. For 
example, in one case a ceiling was put on the rate of 
increase of the unitary charge. In two cases, an 
efficiency reduction was explicitly introduced: this took 
the form of an annual reduction, by a fixed amount, in 
the relevant index. In the discussion below, we have 
adjusted our results where appropriate to allow for 
these cases. 
 
The following table shows the number of projects by 
indexation percentage used under the two broad 
indexation approaches. 
 
Table 1:  Number of projects by indexation type 
and percentage indexed 
 
Indexation 
Percentage 
Projects where 
percentage of 
unitary charge 
indexed 
Projects where 
whole unitary 
charge 
indexed at 
percentage of 
inflation 
100% 12  
80% to 99% 0 1 
60% to 79% 6 8 
40% to 59% 2 5 
Less than 40% 2 1 
  
 
The percentage increase in the amount that a local 
authority will have to pay to meet the unitary charge in 
any given year of the contract will, in general, depend 
on the particular indexation method used, on the 
indexation percentage, on the percentage of the 
unitary charge covered by level playing field support, 
and on how many years of the project have gone by 
since the first unitary charge payment.  
At the very start of the contract period, however, the 
annual percentage increase does not depend on the 
indexation approach used. Specifically, let us define 
the parameter    to be the ratio of the indexation 
percentage to the percentage of the initial unitary 
charge which the council has to find from its own 
resources. Then, if inflation is 100 r%, the initial 
percentage increase in the council’s payments is 
given by the following formula:  
Initial percentage increase in council payment  =  
r 100 . 
 
The derivation of this formula is given in the Annex. 
Note that, the parameter   has a value greater than 
1 when the indexation percentage of the unitary 
charge is greater than the percentage of the charge 
which the council has to fund from its own resources. 
The following table shows the values of   for the 37 
projects. 
 
Table 2: Values of    
 
   Number of projects 
>3 1 
2.5 to 2.99 3 
2 to 2.49 4 
1.5 to 1.99 10 
1 to 1.49 16 
0.5 to 0.99 3 
 
 
Intuitively, what one might expect is that government 
funding support would be some fraction of the capital 
cost of the project: in other words, that the portion of 
the unitary charge which is fixed, (reflecting payments 
for capital), would be larger than the portion covered 
by level playing field support. But this is just another 
way of saying that we would expect the portion which 
is subject to inflation would be smaller than the portion 
which the local authority has to find from its own 
resources. If the local authority is following Treasury 
guidance, then the indexation percentage should 
reflect the portion of the charge which is subject to 
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inflation. So we would expect   to be less than 1. 
But what is striking about the table is the number of 
projects where   is greater than 1: this occurs in 34 
of the 37 projects. This therefore raises questions 
about local authority procedures, and how well they 
followed Treasury guidance on indexation.  
 
The consequence of the fact that   is greater than 1 
for the vast majority of projects is that most authorities 
will be paying an above inflation increase in their own 
contribution during the early years of the project. 
Indeed, since 18 projects have a    value which is 
greater than 1.5, in these 18 projects the authorities 
will be paying a contribution which increases initially 
by over 1.5 times the rate of inflation. Of these 18, 
eight will be paying at more than twice the rate of 
inflation, and 1 will be paying at more than three times 
the rate of inflation.   Once the project is past the 
initial unitary charge payments, the two different 
indexation schemes produce different trajectories: 
 
Schemes where a percentage of the unitary 
charge is indexed:  For such schemes, the 
percentage increase in the local authority contribution 
will converge through time to the limiting value of the 
inflation index used. So, if the initial   is greater than 
1, this means that the percentage increase paid by 
the authority will decline each year, but will always be 
greater than the inflation rate. The rate of 
convergence in these cases is, however, very slow. 
For example, the time it will take to half the gap 
between the initial increase in the authority’s 
contribution and the rate of inflation is over 15 years 
for 15 of these 17 authorities, assuming inflation 
continues at 2.5%. If inflation increases, then 
convergence is somewhat faster.  
 
Nevertheless it is clear that, for authorities where a 
percentage of the unitary charge is indexed, and for 
which   is materially greater than 1, then they can 
expect to make contributions which increase at a rate 
well above the rate of inflation for many years. 
 
Schemes where the unitary charge is 
indexed at a percentage of inflation: these 
schemes behave differently. Expressing the 
indexation percentage as a fraction, then the 
percentage increase in the local authority contribution 
will converge to that fraction of the rate of inflation. 
So, if the   for such a scheme is greater than 1, then 
after a number of years, the percentage increase in 
the local authority’s payment will drop below the rate 
of inflation. The Annex gives the formula for the 
number of years until this will happen, (and also gives 
the algebra justifying the other statements in this and 
the preceding paragraph).  
The following table shows the number of years it will 
take, for the fourteen projects in this indexation 
category, and with a   greater than1, to reach the 
point where the percentage increase in the local 
authority’s payment drops to the rate of inflation. 
Table 3 shows this for two inflation assumptions: 2.5% 
and 5%.  
 
 
Table 3:  For fourteen projects Indexed at a 
percentage of inflation, number of years until 
increase in local authority’s payment drops to the 
rate of inflation 
 
Number of 
years 
Inflation at 
2.5% per 
annum 
Inflation at 5% 
per annum 
0 to 5  1 
6 to 10 1 5 
11 to 15 3 5 
16 to 20 2  
21 to 25  1 
26 to 30 5 1 
Over 30 3 1 
 
The contract periods for the projects are mainly thirty 
years with some at twenty five years. Therefore, it can 
be seen that, at 2.5% inflation, (which was, in the 
main, that expected when the contracts were signed), 
then at least three projects would have had an above 
inflation increase in the local authority payment 
throughout the life of the project. Only four out of the 
fourteen would have reached a below inflation 
increase during the first half of the project life. 
Interestingly, this particular aspect improves if inflation 
increases: with inflation at 5%, eleven projects would 
reach a below inflation increase in their first half of the 
life of the project. 
 
In summary, what we have shown in this section is 
that most local authority schools PFI projects in 
Scotland can look forward to above inflation increases 
in the contributions which local authorities will have to 
make for that part not funded by the level playing field 
support provided by the Scottish government. And in 
some cases, particularly in the early years of the 
project, the increases will be very much more than the 
rate of inflation. This in itself is not worrying: a local 
authority may have budgeted for this, and the stream 
of payments may represent good value for money. 
But the situation is potentially worrying where the 
authority has effectively cut corners in its original 
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assessment of affordability: or, of course, if the 
financial situation facing authorities dramatically alters 
for the worse.  
 
 
Affordability assessments in practice: 
were corners cut? 
In this section we consider the evidence from Final 
Business Cases on the methods and assumptions 
used by local authorities in assessing the affordability 
of PFI projects. As central government guidance 
makes clear, projects should not proceed if 
affordability is not fully tested. It is to be expected 
therefore that Final Business Cases should contain a 
full and thorough assessment of affordability issues. 
In fact, in many of the business cases, the detail 
contained in the affordability assessment is 
disappointing. This lack of detail is, in itself, a matter 
of some concern. But from what detail is available, a 
number of specific issues and problems can be 
identified. In particular:  
 
Issues in final years of project not 
adequately addressed 
In a number of the projects, the level playing field 
support provided by the Scottish government 
terminates a year or more before the end of the 
concession period of the project, leaving a substantial 
funding gap at the end of the project life. Out of the 28 
PFI projects for which we have information on this 
aspect, there were two cases in which level playing 
field support terminated two years before the end and 
two cases in which it terminated two and a half to 
three years before the end – but in none of these is 
the issue addressed of how this gap is to be filled. For 
example, in one project the resulting gap amounted to 
£130 million in nominal terms in total over the last two 
and a half years of the project, (equivalent to over £60 
million in today’s prices). 
 
Savings assumed from demographic 
change 
In three cases, future savings from demographic 
change were expected to contribute towards the 
affordability gap. Given that demographic factors form 
a significant part of the formula for the allocation of 
central government revenue support to local 
authorities, it is difficult to see how authorities can 
expect to profit significantly from the effect of a falling 
schools’ population. 
 
Use of schools fund 
Eleven authorities stated that they planned to use part 
of their Schools Fund allocation to help achieve 
affordability. The Schools Fund was introduced by the 
previous Labour/LibDem government as a capital 
grant to local authorities for the purpose of making 
improvements to the school estate. It was open to 
local authorities to use fund monies for the capital 
investment part of the revenue costs of supporting 
approved school PPP projects. However, building the 
assumption of continuing Schools Fund availability 
into an affordability assessment which extends over 
twenty-five to thirty years appears optimistic, given 
that Schools Fund grants were only ever available on 
a three year rolling basis. As one council put it “the 
main area of potential risk being in relation to the use 
of Schools Fund monies which cannot at this stage be 
predicted to be available for the full thirty years of the 
contract”. 
 
Using the proceeds of the sales of surplus 
land 
In eleven projects, part of the funding was assumed to 
come from the sale of land surplus to requirements. 
This in itself is entirely legitimate. However, in two 
cases, the assumptions made by authorities about the 
proceeds from land sales proved to be unduly 
optimistic. In both cases, by the time the authority 
attempted to sell the land, they were caught by the 
decline in land values caused by the credit crunch. As 
a result, one of these authorities has had to resort to 
short term borrowing. (In fact, at least one of these 
authorities was caught by the tightening of the rules 
on land sales by the Scottish Executive in 2006. Prior 
to that date, some authorities had been allowed to use 
land sale proceeds to make a capital injection to 
project costs before the end of the construction 
phase. This ran counter to the philosophy of PFI, that, 
to avoid risk, payments to the PFI consortium should 
only start on completion of construction. This 
illustrates how, paradoxically, a rule designed to avoid 
one kind of risk had the effect of exposing this 
particular council to another type of risk.) 
 
In each case where councils have planned to use land 
sales income, the benefit from those land sales has 
been spread over the lifetime of the project, either 
through a reduction in the unitary charge or through 
the setting up of some form of sinking fund 
arrangement. Where councils have invested land 
sales proceeds at a variable rate of interest, this does 
expose them to future interest rate risk. 
 
Use of temporary funding source without 
addressing longer term implications 
In one case, the council built up a savings fund of 
£3.5 million in the five years preceding the start of the 
project, which it then used up completely in order to 
meet the first year affordability target. No explanation 
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was given in the Final Business Case as to where the 
corresponding funds would come from for the 
remaining years of the project. This £3.5 million gap 
as from year 2 of the project is particularly worrying as 
in this case the whole of the unitary charge is indexed 
at RPI. 
  
Rises in council tax 
Five authorities were planning on specific increases in 
council tax, with a further two considering increases. 
Again, in itself, this is perfectly legitimate. But in one 
case, the rises being planned for by the authority, 
specifically because of their PFI project, were very 
significant – namely, an extra 1% on council tax each 
year between 2006/07 and 2017/ 18, followed by a 
further 0.7% in 2018/19. By 2018/19, therefore, 
council tax was projected to be 13.5% higher than it 
would otherwise have been without the PFI project: 
this higher level would then continue. While this is a 
local democratic issue, nevertheless, there must be a 
risk that this particular council is placing itself at the 
margin of what its local electorate is likely to tolerate, 
and has therefore placed itself in a position where it 
has little or no room for manoeuvre if unexpected 
contingencies were to arise.  
The current moratorium on council tax rises must 
mean that these authorities are having to find other 
means of funding their affordability gap. 
 
Use of planned refinancing gains 
In the case of one project, the Council built into its 
affordability assessment the potential use of 
refinancing gains which it was hoped would accrue to 
the Council from the very project in question. This 
means that the Council’s affordability assessment is 
dependent on the project outperforming its own value 
for money model. The Council is therefore exposed to 
risk if the project fails to outperform – in other words 
project risk is being transferred back to the Council. 
This runs counter to the whole idea of risk transfer in 
PFI. Indeed, if the Council was so confident that the 
project was going to outperform on its original cost 
projections, then the question arises as to why it did 
not press the consortium for a better deal in the first 
place. 
 
Use of other non-indexed funds 
In a number of projects, authorities brought in to their 
affordability calculations other funding streams which 
they specifically noted were non-indexed. These 
included fixed sums from the schools fund, 
contributions from central property maintenance, and 
annual fixed sum capital contributions. While it is 
perfectly appropriate for councils to use whatever 
finance is available, difficulties could arise if inflation is 
higher than that assumed at the time of the 
affordability assessment. The greater the amount of 
finance which comes from non-indexed sources, the 
greater must be the rate of increase of the residual 
revenues which the council has to find. Effectively, 
going back to the discussion above surrounding the 
  values derived in table 2, use of additional non-
indexed sources of finance over and above level 
playing field support will have the effect of increasing 
the   terms as regards the council’s non-indexed 
contribution.  
 
Sculpting of unitary charge to ease 
affordability, but leading to mistaken 
indexation 
In at least one project, the council chose a profile of 
unitary charge payments which had been sculpted to 
increase in line with the initially assumed rate of 
inflation.  This approach led to lower payments in the 
first few years and so gave a more convenient 
payment profile for the council. This in itself is not 
necessarily wrong. But the council then appears to 
have made a mistake in indexing the whole unitary 
charge at 100% of RPI. A more appropriate approach 
would have been to convert that part of the unitary 
charge which was covering loan charges into a profile 
increasing in line with the original inflation 
assumption, (say, 2.5%): and then to specify that this 
part of the unitary charge would be indexed at a fixed 
rate of 2.5%, come what may, with the rest indexed at 
inflation.  If inflation increases above 2.5%, then 
indexing the whole unitary charge at inflation, as the 
council did, will be more expensive than this 
approach.     
 
It is clear from the above examples that there are a 
number of problems with the affordability 
assessments carried out by councils. But these are 
just examples. Because of the amount of information 
either not supplied in the Final Business Cases, or 
redacted in those versions released to us under 
Freedom of Information, it is not possible to achieve a 
comprehensive overview of the quality of affordability 
assessments carried out. Nevertheless, there is 
sufficient information in the above examples to 
indicate that problems are considerable and 
widespread.  
 
What Went Wrong? 
As noted above, Treasury guidance is clear on the 
approach authorities are expected to adopt towards 
indexation: and the guidance also warns about the 
danger of over-indexation. On the other hand, there is 
strong evidence from our analysis of indexation in 
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practice that many authorities have failed to follow this 
guidance. In particular, the number of   terms in 
table 2 which are materially greater than 1 indicates 
that over-indexation is widespread.  
 
Similarly, despite the requirement on authorities to 
carry out careful assessments of affordability, the 
evidence in the preceding section indicates that many 
authorities have cut corners in these assessments.  
 
It is quite clear, therefore, that in this aspect of PFI 
things have gone quite badly wrong. This points to 
failure, not just on the part of the local authorities 
responsible for negotiating PFI contracts, but also on 
the part of those central bodies, like the Treasury, the 
Scottish government, and Partnerships UK, 
responsible for general oversight of the process. The 
data on which we have based the research reported 
here does not provide any evidence as to why these 
failures occurred. But there is reason to believe that 
the following may have been among the contributory 
factors: 
 
a) there appears to have been a generally 
accepted view at the time that PFI was “the 
only game in town”. This meant that, if 
capital investment did not take place through 
the mechanism of PFI, it was unlikely to take 
place at all – which would have put the public 
sector side in negotiations under extreme 
pressure to secure a deal.  
 
b) it also appears that there was a fairly widely 
held view that continued economic growth 
would lead to a benign public expenditure 
climate in the long term. This is likely to have 
meant that potential affordability problems, 
and the overall burden of unitary charge 
payments in the longer term, would be 
largely discounted.  
 
One area where Treasury oversight appears to have 
been particularly deficient is in relation to future 
variations in inflation. It seems reasonable that 
authorities should take as their central planning 
assumption the government’s target inflation forecast, 
or something close to it. Historically, however, inflation 
in the UK has been extremely variable, as is 
illustrated by the chart, which shows RPI and RPIx 
inflation since 1969. As the chart shows, in the thirty 
years, (that is the life of a typical PFI project), before 
the start of the first Scottish schools PFI scheme, 
inflation was at times as high as 20 odd percent per 
annum. Against this historical background, it seems 
optimistic, to say the least, to assume that the UK has 
now entered into a new paradigm of economic 
management and performance, and that inflation will 
not depart materially from 2.5% over the next 25 to 30 
years. Despite this, in modelling the effects of variant 
inflation assumptions on their financial projections, 
authorities typically considered possible variations in 
inflation which were very small, (often less than 1%). 
With RPI inflation currently running at almost 5%, and 
with a real risk that it could go higher, authorities now 
appear unduly exposed to possible levels of inflation 
which they have not considered as variants in their 
PFI modelling. We would regard it as a fundamental 
responsibility of the Treasury to issue appropriate 
advice to authorities to ensure that they consider a 
sufficiently wider range of variant assumptions in their 
financial modelling. The Treasury has clearly not 
issued adequate advice on this point: this indicates a 
significant failure, either of undue optimism, or to 
adequately monitor what authorities were doing, or 
both. 
 
Conclusion 
As we have seen, councils’ own contributions to PFI 
projects, (to which they are of course contractually 
committed), are in many cases projected to increase 
at a rate which is above inflation: in several cases, the 
increases will be very significantly greater than 
inflation for most of the life of the project. This in itself 
is not necessarily problematic: it is entirely legitimate 
that councils should budget like this if this reflects 
their priorities. However, the situation is potentially of 
concern if either or both of the following hold: 
 
a. if councils’ original affordability assessments 
were not soundly based 
 
b. if the overall general revenue support that 
councils get from central government does 
not rise broadly in line with inflation.  
 
As we have seen in a preceding section, there is 
considerable evidence that there were considerable 
problems with the affordability assessments 
undertaken by authorities. Moreover, given the current 
financial cutbacks, there appears little prospect, even 
in the medium term, of central government support to 
local authorities rising in line with inflation.  
 
In other words, both of the above conditions hold: this 
implies that many local authorities are likely to 
experience difficulty in meeting their contractual 
obligations under PFI contracts. The consequences in 
terms of cutbacks on other services, increases in fees 
and charges, and/or increases in council tax, are likely 
to be severe. 
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This serious situation appears to have arisen because 
Treasury guidance, both on the way the unitary 
charge should be indexed, and on affordability 
assessment, has been widely breached. There is a 
clear need for better training for those involved in 
negotiating on the public sector side of any future PFI 
or similar contract: and also for much closer scrutiny 
of contracts and of final business cases by the 
responsible central departments.  
 
____________________ 
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Annex:  Indexation formulae 
 
a) Where proportion of unitary charge is indexed. 
Suppose the initial unitary charge payment in year 0 is 1: suppose a proportion   of the unitary charge is indexed in 
relation to some suitable index, which increases at 100r% per annum: and suppose that level playing field support 
from the government represents a proportion p of the initial unitary charge. 
Then, unitary charge payment in year j = 
) - (1  r)  (1 j  
 , 
and,  payment made by council in year j = 
p) -  - (1  r)  (1 j  
. 
Therefore, 
council payment in year (j+1)/council payment in year j 
 = 
p)] -  - (1  r)  (1[p)]/ -  - (1  r)  (1[ j1j   
    (1) 
When j=0, the value of expression (1) is  
p)-(1
r 
  1


 : 
therefore, the initial percentage increase in the council’s payment is 
p)-(1

 times the rate of inflation. 
As 
 j
, the value of expression (1) tends to (1+r). 
So the council payment under this type of indexation starts by increasing at 
%
p)-(1
r  100
 

 per annum: if the factor 
p)-(1

 is greater than 1,  the percentage increase then decreases through time, but will always be above 100 r%: 
that is, will always be above the rate of inflation. 
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b) Where unitary charge is indexed at a proportion of inflation. 
The notation is the same as in case a), except that   now represents the proportion of inflation at which the whole 
unitary charge is indexed. 
Then,   unitary charge payment in year j = 
 r)   (1 j
 , 
and,    payment made by council in year j = 
p -  r)   (1 j
. 
Therefore, 
council payment in year (j+1)/council payment in year j 
 = 
p] -  r)   [(1 / p] -  r)   [(1 j1j   
    (2) 
When j=0, the value of expression (2) is  
p)-(1
r 
  1


 :  
therefore, the initial percentage increase in the council’s payment is 
p)-(1

 times the rate of inflation. (Note that this 
is the same as case a)). 
As 
 j
, the value of expression (2) tends to 
r)   (1 
. 
So the council payment under this type of indexation starts by increasing at 
%
p)-(1
r  100
 

 per annum: the percentage 
increase then decreases each year, approaching a limiting value of r% 100 per annum. Assuming p)-(1

 > 1, 
this implies that, after a certain number of years, x say, the percentage increase in the council’s payment will drop 
below 100r% per annum: that is, it will drop below the rate of inflation. 
The value of x for which this will happen is the value for which expression (2) = (1+r). 
That is, the value of x such that  
x1x )r  r)(1(1 - r) (1   
 = p – p(1+r): 
That is, such that  
x)r  (1 
 = 
r) -(r
pr

 = 
) -(1
p

 : 
That is,     x  =  
r) log(1
)
)-(1
p
log(



.       (3) 
This is the expression used to derive the results in Table 3. Note that the value of x given by expression (3) 
decreases as r increases. In other words, when the unitary charge is indexed at a percentage of inflation, then the 
higher inflation is, the sooner the council will experience a below inflation increase in its required contribution. 
 
